History of Urban CQB with the Swiss Special Forces

 As the conflict in Gaza continues, the internet has been flooded with videos showcasing urban Close Quarter Battle (CQB). A recent video, for instance, shows a Yahalom fighter neutralizing two terrorists and being injured by a hand grenade. This moment serves as a catalyst for me to delve into the evolution of urban CQB tactics within the Swiss Special Forces from 2002 to 2020. While I'll steer clear of specific technique details and operational procedures for security reasons, I'll offer a broader perspective on these developments.

Back in 2002, our CQB procedures, rooted in the Swiss Infantry "Territorial Grenadiers" of 1993/1994, were influenced heavily by the British and New Zealand SAS. These procedures primarily encompassed "Dynamic Entry" for time-sensitive hostage rescue missions and "Deliberate Entry" for search missions without such urgency. Despite their differing objectives, both methods converged in their approach to dynamic room entry, employing techniques like the buttonhook and crisscross.

However, the urban warfare witnessed in early 21st-century conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted the limitations of these CQB techniques, which were more suited to hostage rescue and police operations than combat. In 2009, we began adapting our methods, learning from partners about "Combat Clearing" procedures developed from recent combat experiences. This new procedure was an advancement from "Deliberate Entry", sharing similar room entry techniques but tailored for slow, methodical missions.

The most perilous aspect of CQB, as is widely recognized, is room entry. This involves breaching a door and entering a potentially hostile space through the so-called "fatal funnel" with little to no cover – a risky manoeuvre requiring at least two men to enter simultaneously, various units even using 3 or 4 people entering the room at once. Acknowledging these risks, in 2012, we adopted the Israeli "Limited Penetration" method after thorough training and collaboration. The "Combat Clearing" procedures quickly proved superior, and we soon integrated it into our training syllabus.

However, this left us with a quandary. We had a safer method for deliberate missions but still relied on the riskier "Dynamic Entry" for urgent hostage rescue operations that are more risky/ dangerous by nature… didn't make much sense. This inconsistency led us to seek a better approach in 2015. Eventually, we adapted "Limited Penetration" techniques for all mission types: Fast (hostage rescue), Slow (deliberate), and IED (incorporating explosive threat scenarios). These newer, simplified procedures enhanced both safety and efficiency.

Our Special Operations Forces (Grenadiers and Parachute Reconnaissance Company) and the Armed Forces Training Centre eventually adopted the "Limited Penetration" procedure for slow and deliberate operations.

Today, it's gratifying to see units like Shayatet 13, Maglan, and Yahalom successfully using "Limited Penetration" in high-intensity combat scenarios. It underscores the importance of continually reassessing and evolving techniques in response to emerging threats. The Swiss Special Forces now possess adapted, modern tactics, but we must remain vigilant and ready to develop these methods further in the years to come. Complacency is not an option in this ever-changing landscape.